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Background
Distributed processing is widely used to provide computing support for many diverse applications. Many of these applications are complex and critical; an error can have catastrophic consequences. Behavior analysis is one of the techniques that can help to discover defects and to check if a program performs as intended. However, distributed programs are generally more complex to analyze than their sequential counterparts. Even for small programs, analysis of their behavior is impractical without the support of an effective automated technique.
Static analysis techniques for concurrent and distributed programs can be used to verify two classes of property: safety and liveness. A safety property asserts that the program never enters an undesirable state [l] . For example, mutual exclusion is a safety property which specifies the absence of a program state where a common resource is simultaneously accessed by more than one client. A liveness property asserts that a program eventually enters a desirable state [l] . For example, freedom from starvation is a liveness property; it says that a program state, where some request is served, will finally be entered.
In this paper, we focus our discussion on safety properties. Safety properties can be specified in terms of regular expressions or deterministic finite-state machines [9, 221. The two formalisms are interchangeable. For ease of understanding, we use the formalism of state machines. State machines that specify safety properties are called property automata. Each property automaton is so specified as to accept all execution sequences over the set of actions that correspond to a safety property of interest. For example, figure 1 gives a property automaton of a safety property specifying that no execution of action access can occur unless preceded by an execution of lock. 
Related Work
The software architecture of a distributed program can be represented by an hierarchical composition of subsystems, with interacting (primitive) processes at the leaves of the hierarchy. Behavior of a primitive process can be modelled as a state machine whose transitions are labelled by the activities it can perform. Composite processes appear at the nodes of the hierarchy. Each composite process is a subsystem formed by a collection of processes; these processes can be either primitive or composite.
A common approach to the analysis of distributed programs is to construct a semantically equivalent representation of the global system. However, the search space involved generally increases dramatically with the number of parallel processes. Great effort has been made to avoid this state explosion problem by not having to construct the complete state graph. Roughly, the proposed methods can be classified into two categories: reduction by partial ordering and reduction by compositional minimisation.
In the former category, reduction is achieved by avoiding the generation of all paths formed by the interleaving of the same set of transitions [12, 16, 291 . In the latter category, reduction is achieved by intermediate simplification of subsystems [18, 25, 26, 27, 321 . Techniques in this category are known as compositional reachability analysis (CRA). They were originally proposed to remedy the problem of traditional reachability analysis techniques [2, 23, 281 which compose the global system representation in a single step. Promising results have been reported. Yeh [31] described several case studies which suggested similar performance between a technique of compositional reachability analysis and that of constraint expressions [3] . Sahnani [25] described an experiment applying compositional reachability analysis to the 4.931 protocol. They found that the intermediate state space graphs generated never exceeded 1,000 states although the global state space graph given by traditional reachability analysis of the protocol contained over 60,000 states. Furthermore, CRA techniques are particularly suitable to analyse programs which are likely to evolve. The techniques help localize the effect of change. When changes are applied to a program, only the state machines of those subsystems that are affected by the changes need be re-computed.
Although CRA techniques have advantages over traditional techniques for reachability analysis, the system representation generated cannot be utilised to validate behavioral properties involving actions which are not globally observable. Verification is restricted to those properties formed only by globally observable actions. In this paper, we enhance the CRA techniques with a mechanism to validate safety properties of subsystems which contain actions that may not be globally observable. These properties are violated when those subsystems, within the context of a distributed application, can perform execution sequences not acceptable to the corresponding property automata. The validation can be carried out in the enhanced mechanism of CRA. If no violation of safety properties is detected, the analysis constructs a global LTS observationally equivalent [ 191 to that constructed using conventional CRA techniques; otherwise it indicates which and how safety properties are violated. We have found no similar work of providing this feature in the framework of CRA. The proposed mechanism is adapted from the techniques of employing context constraints to alleviate the state explosion problem of CRA r4, 131. The concept of context constraints was originally proposed by Graf [ 131 to abstract behavior restrictions imposed on a subsystem by its neighbouring processes due to the need for co-ordination. To enhance the mechanism of CRA, the state machine formalism is augmented with a special undefined state x. The undefined state is used to capture potential violation of safety properties specified by users. The same philosophy can also be utilised to detect erroneous context constraints P I *
Paper Outline
In the next section, we introduce labelled transition systems and present a gas station system which is to be used as a case study in our discussion. Section 3 presents a technique to detect and locate violation of safety properties related to subsystems. This is followed by conclusions in section 4.
Background
Labelled Transition Systems
A labelled transition system (LTS) can be used to model the behavior of a synchronous communicating process in a distributed program. An LTS contains all the states the process may reach and all the transitions it may perform. For instance, figure 2 represents an LTS describing a lamp which can be either on or off. The lamp can go from state 0 to 1 as the consequence of an external action consisting of pushing the switch-on button. Pushing the switch-off button causes the opposite transition.
Similar activities performed by a program are labelled by the same action if there is n o need to distinguish them from one another. The set of actions which are considered Logically, a process may only perform actions belonging to its alphabet. For example, Lamp cannot perform an action deliver which is outside its alphabet. However, a process might never perform an action in its alphabet. An alphabet is so chosen as to make analysis tractable. This involves decisions to ignore many other properties and actions considered to be of lesser interest. A process may perform some activities which cannot be influenced by its environment. These activities are labelled by an internal action which is represented by the symbol T.
The LTS computational model has been widely used in the literature for specifying and analysing distributed programs [8, 10, 17, 24, 30 ]. In the model, communicating processes are synchronised through actions sharing the same labels. For example, let a represent the action in which a machine in a flexible manufacturing system transfers a part to a conveyor belt. The action a occurs only if the machine is ready to hand over the part, and the conveyor belt is simultaneously prepared to receive the part. Thus the action a requires simultaneous participation of both processes, and a must be a possible action in the standalone behavior of each process. Formally, an LTS of a process P is a quadruple < S, A, A, q > where
S is a set of states; A = A ' U {T}, where A' is the communicating alphabet of P which does not contain the internal action 7;
(iii) A c S x A x S , denotes a transition relation that maps from a state and an action onto another state; (iv) q is a state in S which indicates the initial state of P.
An LTS of P = < S, A, A, q > transits into another LTS of P' = < S , A, A, q ' > with an action a E A if and only if (q, a, 4' ) E A and q' # n, where n is a special undefined state, discussed further below. That is, U < S , A , A , q~< S , A , A , q ' > i f f ( q , a , q ?~A a n d
Since there is a one-to-one mapping between a process P and its LTS, we use the term process and LTS interchangeably. Therefore, the above statement can be rewritten as follows: otherwise it is said to be non-detenninistic.
Behavior of a process may be observed by means of its execution traces. An execution trace of a process P is a sequence of actions that P can perform starting from its initial state. For example, the sequence <switch-on, switch-oj5 is a trace of Lamp in figure 2. Let us denote the set of possible traces of a process P as tr(P). The formal definition of traces can be found in the work of Hoare [15] . An LTS may contain a special state X, which is called the undefined state [7] . A process with n as its initial state is considered to be undefined. An undefined process is denoted as n = < {n}, A, 0, n 2, where A is the n is a termination process because there can be no transitions emerging from state X. A transition is said to be undefined when its destination state is n. For example, (0, switch-off, n) is an undefined transition in Lamp. A trace is said to be undefined if it involves execution of undefined transitions; otherwise the trace said to be defined. For instance, <switch-on, switch-off, switch-off, is an undefined trace in Lamp. A process is said to be defined if it contains no undefined traces. In principle, all processes in a system design are defined; they should be free of undefined state n and should not contain undefined traces. The constructs of K and n are generated automatically for detection of the violation of safety properties.
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Observability of actio" in a process can be controlled by a restriction operator t. PTL represents the process projected from P in which only the actions in set L are observable. The restriction operator ensures that P has undefined traces if and only if PTL has undefined traces.
Rules (1) and (2) give the transitional semantics of the restriction operator. Processes in a distributed program may also be composed by a composition operator II similar to that used in CSP [15] . PllQ is the parallel composition of processes P and Q with synchronisation of the actions common to both of their alphabets and interleaving of the others. The alphabet of PllQ is given by the union of their individual alphabets (i.e. aPuaQ).
Rules (3), (4) and ( 5 ) in figure 4 give the transitional semantics of the composition operator. The operator is both commutative and associative. Figure 5 shows the LTS of AllB composed from processes A and B by applying the rules. The nles also specify that a composite process is undefined if it contains an undefined process.
Rule (6) states that the restriction operator f can be distributed into the composition operator II if internal actions of constituent processes do not have conflicting names. Non-conflicting action names in a program can be achieved by action renaming. 
Behavioral Equivalences
The notion of observation on processes is postulated to describe the process behavior conceived by an observer making experiments about processes. Behavior equivalence is a concept to identify a pair of processes which cannot be distinguished by such observations. Strong semantic equivalence, denoted as -, is used to relate two processes whose behaviors are indistinguishable to an observer by tests of interest to the theory of concurrency. Weak semantic equivalence, denoted as s, is used to relate two processes whose behaviors are indistinguishable to an observer when given their observable behaviors. Both equivalences assume external observers are notified if processes have assumed state x.
Let and T and A be the universal set of processes and actions including z, respectively. A strong semantic equivalence -is the union of all relations R E TxT satisfying that (P, Q) E R implies:
(i) aP= aQ;
(ii) P = n if and only if Q = n; and (iii) for all a E A : A weak semantic equivalence = is the union of all relations R c !&T satisfying that (P, Q) E R implies:
(i) a P = a Q ;
(ii) P = n if and only if Q = n; and
a a (a) P+P'implies 3 Q', Q 3 Q'and (P', Q') E R. a a (b) H ' implies 3 P', P 3 P' and (P', Q') E R.
The strong and weak semantic equivalences coincide with the strong and weak equivalence (cf. Milner [20] ) respectively if the first two requirements (i) and (ii) are dropped. If two processes P and Q are free of the undefined state 7~ then (i) P -Q implies P and Q are strongly equivalent;
(ii) P = Q implies P and Q are weakly equivalent.
A Gas Station Example
As an illustration of our discussion, we present a gas station example originally proposed by Helmbold and Luckham [14] . The system models an automated gas station with an operator, a pump, two customers and a queue holding customers' requests. Figure 6(a) gives the LTSs presenting the behavior of the operator and the request queue. The operator may initially choose to accept money prepaid by customers (prepayi) or accept the amount to be charged from the pump (chargei). After accepting money from a customer, the operator activates the pump if it is available; otherwise does nothing. On receiving the charge 
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information from the pump, the operator gives the change (= pfepayi -chargei) to the customer and activates the pump again if there are other customers waiting for the pump. Figure 6(b) shows the behavior of the pump and that of the two customers. A customer who has paid the money can start the pump once it has been activated. After starting the pump, the customer may at any time request the pump to finish pumping and wait for the change from the operator. Upon receiving the "finish" request, the pump informs the operator of the charge information.
The gas station system' is formed by a parallel composition of the primitive processes Operator, Queue, Pump, Custl and Cust2 using a compositional hierarchy as shown in figure 7. Subsystems, represented by boxes with rounded comers, are composite processes formed by composition of simpler subsystems or primitive processes. Primitive processes, represented by boxes with sharp corners, are leaves of the compositional hierarchy. The behaviors of primitive processes are given as LTSs.
The hierarchy reflects a conceptual view held by software developers of the gas station system. Subsystems are introduced to make the system more modular and comprehensible. This is achieved by hiding internal actions of a subsystem from external processes. For instance, subsystem Counter hides actions pump-avail, pump-occupied, cust-none and cust-wait from processes outside the Counter. Textually, we write: Let us assume in the following discussion that the software developers wish to reason about the global behavior of the system on actions prepayl and prepay2. In other words, only these two actions are observable in the global LTS of Gassystem. GmSystem = ( Station II Cfients )?{ prepayl, prepay2 }
Enhanced Compositional Reachability
Limitations of Compositional Reachability
Promising results have been reported in recent literature on adopting a compositional approach to derive the overall system behavior using reachability analysis [25, 26, 321. In compositional reachability analysis techniques, the model of the target system is given as an LTS which describes the overall system behavior. Given a compositional hierarchy, the LTS of a system is composed step by step from those of its subsystems in a bottom-up manner. In each intermediate step, the LTS of a subsystem is simplified by hiding all internal actions. For instance, the LTS of GasStation in figure 7 can be composed in four steps. First Figure 8 shows the global LTS thus obtained. It shows that the gas systcm repeatedly accepts money from C u s t l and Cust2 by means of actions p r e p a y l and prepay2. There is no particular ordering relation between Analysis Analysis the occurrences of prepayl and prepay2.
The key to the success of CRA techniques is to employ a modular software architecture and hide as many internal actions as possible in each subsystem. A subsystem containing fewer observable actions can generally be represented by a simpler LTS. However, the properties that are then available for reasoning in the analysis is constrained by the set of remaining globally observable actions. For instance, the properties that are available for reasoning in the analysis of the GasStation can only be formed by actions prepayl and prepay2. Safety properties of subsystems that involve other actions cannot be examined from the global LTS of the GusStation in figure  8 . Examples of these other properties are that the Operator must give the right change to the right customer (figure 9(a)) and the P u m p must complete the service to a customer before serving the other ( figure 9(b) ). If these properties are to be verified in the CRA, actions chargel, charge2, changel, change2, s t a r t l , start2, finish1 and finish2 need to be made globally observable. However, this would go against the key hiding principle of CRA techniques and thus undermine the effectiveness of the associated analysis. In the following, we introduce a technique that is capable of checking these safety properties without increasing the set of globally observable actions in the GasStation.
Validation of Safety Properties
Let P be a process equals QTL. A safety property of a process P can be represented by a deterministic property automaton T = (A, S, A, q) where -a T c crQ , and Tis free of undefined traces and internal action T~.
For example, the property automaton Right-Change in The essence of violation detection is to derive an image automaton based on a given property automaton. This image automaton is then introduced into the system so that the automaton is forced into an undefined state when the system performs a trace not acceptable to the original property automaton. The fact that the image automaton can attain state n: can be confirmed by the existence of a reachable state n: in the global LTS. The image property automaton T' = (A, Su{n}, A', 4) of a given property automaton T = ( A , S, A, q ) can be derived using the following two steps: 1. initialise A to A 2. for all a E A and s E S where there does not exist s' E (s, a, s') E A, add (s, a, .n) to A For example, figure 10 gives the corresponding image automata for Right-Change and Right-Service of figure 9. The image automaton so constructed satisfies two conditions:
S such that
(i) T and T' have the same set of defined traces (i.e.
tr(T)); and
(ii) for any process P , P II T' does not contain undefined traces iff tr( PI'c~T) c tr( T 1.
Proof of condition (i)
Step (1) in the construction of image automaton ensures that A is a subset of A' .
Step (2) ensures that for any transition (s, a, s? betongs to A-A,s' equals n. Hence, the A and A contain the same set of transitions that do not involve state n;; i.e.
Since T and T' share the same initial state 4, all defined traces that can be performed by T can also be performed by T' and vice versa. As a result, T and T' have the same set of defined traces, which is equal to tr( T ) . 0 ((s, a, s) I (s, a, S' )EAA s'#Z).
{(s, a, s') ~,~, S~E $ A S ' + X ) =
Proof of condition (ii) Case (1): ifpart: Assume tr(P?aT) s; f r o . tr((P H T??aT? equals ( t I t E tr(P?aT3ncr(T')) which in tum equals ( t I t E tr(P?aT)ntr(T)}u( t I t E tr(P?ar)n(tr(T')-tr(r))}. The image process T' is so constructed that only those traces in tr(T')-tr(T) can lead T' in an undefined state. Hence, { t I t E tr(P?aTpr(T)] and ( t I c E tr(P?aTm(tr(T')-tr(i7))
represent the set of defined and undefined traces respectively in ( P II T')?aT', As tr(P?crZ)gr(n, tr(P?aT?n(tr(T')-tr(r)) is an em ty set. As a result, there are no undefined traces in ( P II T')faaT: (P II T??aT' is defined. Since the restriction operator does not affect the definedness property of a process, PIIT' is also defined. Case (2): onfy-if part: Assume PIIT' is totally defined. Let us suppose tr( P?aT ) E; tr( T ). This implies that P?aT can perform a trace t that does not belong to tr(T). We note that any prefix oft can be performed by P?aT: Let s be a prefix of t such that T can perform all prefixes of s but not the s itself. By the method we construct the image process, s can also be performed by T'. A s a result, s is an undefined trace in T: Thus s is an undefined trace in (P?aT' II T3, which is equal to (P II T')?'aT'. By the semantics of restriction operator, the existence of an undefined trace in (P It T')?aT' implies the existence of an undefined trace in P II T'. This contradicts to the assumption that PIIT' is defined. Thus, the supposition cannot hold. c3
Condition (ii) enables us to detect violation of safety properties in a system by checking the existence of undefined traces in the composite process formed by the system and the image property automata. If undefined traces exist in the composite process, some safety properties are violated. An image automaton can be composed directly with a component process, whose alphabet is a superset of that of the automaton, in the CRA. For example, figure 11 shows the modified compositional hierarchy to include the image property automata of figure 10. Figure 12 gives the global LTS derived by the CRA based on the hierarchy in figure 11 . Since the global LTS contains undefined traces, the Gas Station system does not satisfy both safety properties represented by the property automata Right-Change and Right-Service.
Locating the Violation
The above technique giives the information whether all specified safety properties are satisfied. However, users would normally wish to know which particular safety properties are violated, and in what way. To provide this information, the CRA technique needs to be further enhanced with a mechanism to keep track of the relation between those transitions leading to the undefined state x in the global LTS and those in the image property automata.
Let f P c ((S-( A ] ) x~{ x } )~~( (~(~~)~(~) )
be a mapping associated with a process P, where S and A denote the universal sets of states and actions, respectively. The value of fp(s, a, x) indicates the set of undefined transitions in the image interface processes that contribute to the undefined transition (s, a, x) in P.
The mapping f p is so evaluated that fp(s, a, x ) equals the empty set 0 if (s, a, x) is a transition not reachable from the initial state in I); otherwise:
when P is an image property automaton,
which identifies a process weakly semantically equivalent to that identified by s 1.
The subscript P in an undefined transition (s, a, n)p indicates its owner process. For instance Right-change' is the process which owns the transition (0, c h a n g e l , n)Righr-Cbnge'. Since the set union operation can be computed using bitwise arithematics in imperative programming languages, its computational complexity is linear in time and size. It does not increase the computational complexity of the error detection mechanism. The global LTS given the the CRA based on the hierarchy is given in figure 12. Using the above evalutaion rules of f P , fCasSration has a value of This suggests that safety violation occurs at transitions (1, change2, .IC) and (2, c h a n g e l , x) in image property automata Right-Change ' (figure loa). The former represents the situation where chargel can be followed by change2 and the latter represents the situation where charge2 can be followed by changel. In either situation, customers receive the wrong change. Nevertheless, the safety property specified by property automaton Right-Service (figure 9b) can be ensured by the Gas Station. The violation can be corrected by replacing the Pump in figure 6(b) by that in figure 13(a) . Since the replacement does not affect the behavior of subsystems Counter and Clients in figure 11, their LTSs need not be computed again. In other words, only the LTSs of Station and Gassystem are to be re-computed. The global LTS thus constructed is given in figure 13(b) . As the global LTS does not contain any reachable undefined state x, and hence there is no violation of safety properties represented by Right-Change and Right-Service.
A prototype based on the concepts discussed has been implemented on a Sun Sparc 1000 Server. Table 14 gives the computational timejn seconds required to compute the global LTS of the gas example. The first column indicates the number of customers in the gas station. The second and third columns give the computational time required to evaluate the global LTS based on the original system specification in figures 6(a) and 6(b). The fourth and fifth column give the computational time to re-evaluate the global LTS when the specification of pump in figure 6(b) is replaced by that in figure 13 . As mentioned, only subsystems Station and Gassystem need be involved in the re-evaluation. We found that incorrect specification could significantly increase the computational costs in validating safety properties. The experiment also suggested that the analysis technique should be further improved before it can handle realistic systems. A possible way to reduce the computational costs is to combine the technique with various state space reduction mechanisms, such as those proposed by Godefroid [ 
Correctness of the Global LTS
In the previous work of the authors [4] , it has been shown that the overall behavior of a system 2 remains unchanged after the addition of a process Ifc if Z and Ifc satisfy the three criteria in an interface theorem ( figure 15 ). Let Zl'L be a target system and Zf c be an image property automaton specified by users. Using the construction mechanism for image automata ensures that Zfc and 2 satisfy criteria (i) and (iii) in the theorem. In addition, it also ensures that 2 II Ifc does not contain undefined traces if and only if tr(flctZfc) E tr( Ifc ). As a result, the absence of 
Conclusions and Future Work
The paper presents a mechanism to check safety properties associated with subsystems in the framework of CRA techniques. These safety properties are specified in terms of deterministic finite-state machines called property automata which may involve actions that are not globally observable. The property automata are said to be violated if the associated subsystems can perform traces not acceptable to them. An image automaton can be derived from each given property automaton. The image automaton is trapped into a special undefined state x when the associated subsystem performs a trace which is not acceptable to the original property automaton. This can be identified directly from the existence of a reachable state n in the global LTS. If the LTS is free from state n, it represents the overall behavior of the system; otherwise the mechanism indicates which safety properties are violated and how they occur. The mechanism may be further optimised by augmenting the CRA technique with the concept of context constraints [4, 71 and partial ordering [ 1 13. These constraints capture behavioral restriction imposed on subsystems by their neighbouring processes.
A prototype supporting the technique has been built. To further explore the potential of the technique, we are hoping to apply it to more complex examples, implementing support tools on workstations, and proposing to incorporate this form of analysis support in an environment for Ihe design and construction of distributed programs, the System Architect's Assistant Strong semantic equivalence is a subrelation of weak semantic equivalence. In the situations where there is an absence of state 7c, the strong and weak semantic equivalence coincide with the strong and weak equivalence respectively as defined by Milner [ 11.
[211. We also developing a framework to integrate this enhanced CRA technique with a data flow analysis technique [5, 61.
